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S
ince the establishment of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh 
in 1976, microfinance has boomed. As of December 31, 2007, 
3,552 microcredit institutions had reached 154 million clients 
worldwide, about 106.6 million of whom were among the poorest 
when they took their first loan. Such expansion can be at least 
partly attributed to the widely adopted practice of group lending 
in microfinance programs. In contrast to individual lending, group 
lending (or joint liability) grants a loan to a group of borrowers, 
and the whole group is liable for the debt of any individual member 
in the group. This practice allows microfinance programs to rely 
mainly on accountability and mutual trust among group members 
rather than financial collateral to insure against default. Given that 
the poor often lack appropriate financial collateral, group lending 
programs offer a feasible way of extending credit to poor people 
who are usually kept out of traditional banking systems.
There is considerable debate about whether such groups can be 
sustainable, achieving sound repayment performance while serving 
poor borrowers. The factors affecting repayment performance are 
thus of great policy relevance. This brief examines whether and 
how much repayment is affected by three factors: the source of 
the loan, groups’ provision of public goods in the form of insurance 
substitutes, and the monitoring and repayment rules of the 
federations of groups. The data come from more than  
2,000 self-help groups (SHGs), federated in 299 village organizations 
in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The SHGs under study were 
supported by a large World Bank program called the Indira Kranti 
Patham (IKP) program, with a cost of US$260 million. The program 
has been replicated in other states in India and may be replicated 
in other countries. A better understanding of factors influencing 
repayment will therefore help improve the performance and 
advance of the program.
Background of the IKP program
Building on Andhra Pradesh’s tradition of SHGs, the IKP program 
was launched in October 2000 to promote the formation of new 
groups and to strengthen existing ones. A typical program SHG 
consists of 10–20 women members who meet regularly to discuss 
social issues and engage in social activities. During these meetings 
each member deposits a small thrift payment into a joint bank 
account. Once enough savings have been accumulated, group 
members can apply for internal loans that draw on accumulated 
savings at an interest rate to be determined by the group. Once 
the group establishes a record of internal saving and repayment, 
it becomes eligible for loans through a commercial bank or IKP 
program funds.
An important component of the program is to support the 
federation of SHGs at the village and mandal (block/county) 
level through formation of village organizations and county 
organizations. The purpose of federation is to capitalize on 
economies of scale in capacity building, credit, and insurance and to 
ensure that public programs reach the poor. Although IKP program 
funds were initially made available to SHGs, they were shifted to 
village organizations and later to county organizations as soon as 
these were established.
The survey
Data for this study come from a survey of 299 village organizations 
conducted by the World Bank in 2006. This brief investigates  
3,350 expired loans made to members of 2,147 SHGs. In the survey, 
all loans taken by each member SHG in the village organizations 
between June 2003 and June 2006 were recorded from account 
books of each organization. The study period started after the 
majority of village organizations were formed and coincided with 
a major drive for SHG formation. Of the 40 million rupees (about 
US$1 million) of aggregate loan principal, about 60 percent of the 
funds were provided by the IKP program, with the rest of the funds 
coming from banks, SHGs, and other sources. Only 63 percent of 
loans from the IKP program were fully repaid, compared with  
87 percent repayment for bank loans and 89 percent repayment for 
internal loans.
The survey provides information on loan terms (size, 
source, length, interest rate, and repayment frequency), SHG 
characteristics (size, age, and membership composition), and village 
organizations’ monitoring and repayment rules. These rules differ 
in four key dimensions:
•  Delinquency management policies. These policies include fees 
to SHGs that miss an installment and loan recovery committees 
to monitor SHGs’ creditworthiness (through a rating system, for 
example). Both would likely increase repayment probability.
•  Monitoring of SHGs’ financial affairs. Here, the study looks at 
three variables: whether the village organization (1) regularly 
inspects member SHGs’ books at monthly meetings; (2) employs 
a trained bookkeeper; and (3) regularly audits members’ books. 
Again, all of these steps should help reduce defaults.
•  The extent to which the village organization provides public 
goods. The study considers whether in-kind rice credit and 
marketing services are provided. The in-kind rice credit is a 
program whereby the village organization acquires subsidized 
rice in bulk under the public distribution scheme and makes it 
available to SHG members as an in-kind credit, with any savings 
from the bulk purchase passed on to members in the form of 
lower prices. Marketing services are the collective activities that 
help SHG members gain access to markets—for example, buying 
and selling in bulk to obtain more favorable prices or to reduce 
transaction costs. Because such benefits can be cut off in case 
of default, they should enhance repayment incentives, especially 
when alternative sources for these benefits are unavailable. 
•  The extent to which SHGs are required to deposit regular 
thrift payments with the village organization. The village 
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cash collateral that can be withheld in case of default and thus 
should increase repayment incentives.
In the sample of 299 village organizations, 36 percent applied 
a sanction for SHGs that miss an installment, 41 percent had a 
loan-recovery committee, 35 percent provided in-kind consumption 
credit, 25 percent provided marketing services, 47 percent 
collected thrift from their member SHGs, 82 percent employed 
trained bookkeepers, 37 percent of the SHGs in the sample were 
regularly audited, and 23 percent presented their books at village 
organization meetings.
Factors influencing loan repayment
The model used to estimate the effects of various factors on 
repayment shows that monitoring and loan recovery arrangements 
are highly significant, both statistically and economically. Regular 
audits, checking of SHG books at village organization meetings, 
and depositing of SHG savings with the village organization 
are estimated to increase the probability of full repayment by 
8.3, 9.5, and 20 percentage points, respectively. Although the 
village organization’s involvement in marketing has no impact on 
repayment, in-kind consumption credit is predicted to increase the 
probability of full payment by 12.7 points, suggesting that non-
economic benefits from credit groups increase repayment incentives. 
This finding also implies that village organizations are better 
positioned to help smooth consumption and address credit market 
imperfections than to intervene in output markets.
The results also suggest that SHGs are more likely to fully repay 
loans from banks—by 18.6 points according to the estimate—than 
loans from the IKP program. The program’s lower repayment rate 
points to limits in village organizations’ credibility, possibly because 
of their relatively recent establishment. High installment frequency 
has an almost equally large effect (15 points), consistent with 
the notion that frequent small installments enhance repayment 
performance for households with credit constraints. As have other 
studies, this study found that full repayment is less likely for loans 
with longer duration and, less significantly, higher interest.
Other studies have found mixed evidence on the impact of 
group characteristics, but the results of this study suggest that 
the probability of repayment increases with the size of the group 
up to about 14 members and decreases thereafter. In contrast, 
the probability of repayment decreases with the length of time 
the group has been in operation up to about five years. Although 
groups with a high percentage of poor individuals show lower rates 
of full repayment, the magnitude is small: a 10-point increase in 
very poor members would reduce full repayment by only  
1.7 points. Here the trade-off between sustainability and service to 
the poorest is much smaller than suggested by some other studies. 
Neither caste composition nor homogeneity has a significant 
impact on repayment. 
Summary and policy implications
In contrast to most existing literature that studies the effects of 
group and individual attributes on loan repayment in microcredit 
groups, this study investigates the effects of exogenous monitoring 
and loan recovery arrangements, together with loan and group 
characteristics. Because banks and others can provide microfinance 
institutions with additional resources contingent on adoption of 
certain minimum rules, the findings from this study could be of 
great practical relevance. The results highlight the following four 
policy implications:
1. Repayment rates are significantly lower on loans originating 
in externally provided grant resources managed by village 
organizations. This finding highlights the need for further 
inquiry on why this is the case and how to improve the 
repayment performance of loans from grant resources. 
2. Among SHGs, external management policies (such as regular 
monitoring and audits and in-kind consumption credit) and 
loan terms (group savings deposits with the lender, frequency 
of repayment) appear far more important to full repayment 
than group characteristics such as the poverty level of 
members. This result suggests that, in this context, even 
groups composed of very poor borrowers can achieve high 
repayment rates if village organizations adopt proper rules 
and management practices. Furthermore, SHG federations and 
other external group supervisors should consider implementing 
the management policies that can encourage full repayment.
3. Third, the results suggest that the optimal size of a group is 
about 14 members. This finding can provide some guidance in 
group formation.  n
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